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Abstract
We analyze the effects of increasing the retirement age in two economies with
overlapping generations and within cohort ex ante heterogeneity. The first economy
has a defined benefit system, and the second economy is in transition from a defined
benefit to a defined contribution. We find that if increase in the retirement age is
phased in a way that allows agents to adjust, welfare is not reduced and welfare effects
have a similar magnitude and between-cohort distribution in both types of the
pension systems.
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1 Introduction
In the policy debate on the consequences of longevity, the systemic reform of the pen-
sion system and the parametric reform are typically viewed as policy alternatives (see
Auerbach et al. 1989; Boersch-Supan and Ludwig 2010; Fehr 2000; Hviding and Marette
1998). The former type of reform consists of switching from a defined benefit (DB) to
a defined contribution (DC) scheme, whereas the latter comprises adjustments in mini-
mum eligibility retirement age, contribution rates, or replacement rates. In countries with
DC schemes, longevity implies substantial reduction of pension benefits. While this does
not automatically require a policy response, in practice, it may translate to higher public
expenditure as well, e.g., for instruments of poverty reduction among the elderly. In coun-
tries with a public DB scheme, longevity translates to higher public finance deficit. Given
the substantive projected extension in the length of life, the foreseen increase in pension
expenditure necessitates a policy adjustment.
Addressing the fiscal consequences of longevity, Heijdra and Romp (2009) emphasize
that, generally, people tend to retire as early as legally allowed, despite rapidly increas-
ing life duration (see also Sauré and Zoabi 2012). These empirical insights suggest that
models with an exogenous retirement may fit well the data. Indeed, early exits despite
longevity are inconsistent with perfect foresight rational agents, unless pension systems
provide perverse incentives—a problem that may be addressed with exogenous retire-
ment age. Giving a summary of multiple comparative cross-country studies, Gruber and
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Wise (2007) argue that retirement systems in most countries are not actuarially neu-
tral. For example, Boersch-Supan (2000) provides an entire list of disincentives to extend
the length of the labor market activity for Germany and some of the other European
countries. Consequently, provided that leisure is a normal good, immediate retirement
becomes a rational response to the incentives from the pension system, which apparently
trumps other incentives, such as those stemming from longevity.1
The problem of pension system incentives to retire early is further attenuated by
another type of concern: the heterogeneity of workers. While it is not customary to relax
the assumption of one representative household within a cohort, few studies do that,
e.g., Bucciol (2011); Cremer and Pestieau (2011); Fehr and Kindermann (2010); Fehr and
Uhde (2014); Fehr et al. (2008); Hairault and Langot (2008); Hénin and Weitzenblum
(2005); Kindermann and Krueger (2014); Kumru and Thanopoulos (2011); McGrattan
and Prescott (2013); and St-Amant and Garon (2015). The consequences of within-cohort
heterogeneity are shown to be substantial.
Summarizing, from a policy perspective, there seem to be three important gaps in the
literature. First, is it possible to raise the retirement age in a way that would have univer-
sal welfare effects for all the cohorts? In other words, does this sort of parametric reform
require redistribution between cohorts? Second, are these conclusions dependent upon
the type of the pension system? In other words, does a systemic reform preclude the effi-
ciency gains from a parametric reform? Third, to what extent are these results universal
in a society where agents not only differ in birth cohort but are also heterogeneous within
each cohort.
We contribute to the literature by addressing these three points with an overlapping
generation model featuring ex ante heterogeneity within cohorts. We use the demo-
graphic projection of longevity to study the effects for consumption and wealth inequality.
We construct two economies: (i) with a DB system and (ii) in a transition from a DB to
a DC system. In these two economies, the baseline scenario keeps the effective retire-
ment age constant, whereas the reform scenarios increases the retirement age—gradually
or immediately. In this framework, we are able to analyze the aggregate and disaggregate
welfare effects for each cohort—the former corresponding to a single representative agent
within a cohort and the latter to possibly heterogeneous effects for agents of different abil-
ities and preferences. In the simulations, retirement age path is set exogenously. Given the
empirical evidence, this assumption is not controversial in the DB pension system. In the
transition to the DC pension system, the link between contributions and pension benefits
itself could imply incentives to remain active for a larger number of years. This implies
that the welfare effects of increasing the retirement age in such a scenario represent an
upper bound of the probable outcomes.2
To make our study of direct applicability, we calibrate the model carefully to the case of
Poland—a country which introduced a change from a DB to a DC system, subsequently
raised the de iure retirement age, and in the process of this transition will have experi-
enced substantial extension in longevity. We find that whether or not the systemic reform
is introduced, the welfare effects from increasing the minimum eligibility retirement age
are of a similar magnitude. While they are welfare enhancing for all the cohorts, they
also imply a downward intensive margin adjustment in the labor supply. Consequently,
cohorts with less timespan to adjust to the reform may experience some negligible wel-
fare deterioration. In fact, transition from DB to DC generates a substantial unexpected
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decrease in pension benefits for many cohorts. Our results hold irrespectively of prefer-
ences, i.e., welfare effects are of the same sign as the representative agent even for agents
with a high preference for leisure and low patience. This makes the parametric reform of
increasing the retirement age a natural complementarity in the transition phase, because
higher pension benefits due to a longer working period and shorter collection period
partially cushion the decrease in pensions due to the systemic reform. This is also the
source of the welfare effects. Actually, if the retirement age reform is delayed, this effect
disappears.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the approaches fol-
lowed in both strands of the literature to motivate our modeling choices. We present in
detail the model in Section 3 and its calibration in Section 4. The results are discussed
in two substantive parts: aggregate welfare and macroeconomic effects in Section 5 and
detailed analysis of heterogeneous agents in Section 6. The paper is completed by the
conclusions as well as the policy recommendations.
2 Insights from the earlier studies
In the literature that builds on the overlapping generation framework, it is customary to
conceptualize the welfare implications of policy reform as a change in utility observed
across cohorts between the baseline and the reform scenario, following among others
Breyer (1989) and Feldstein (1995). Indeed, there has been an extensive body of litera-
ture applying this approach to analyzing the welfare implications of both pension systems
and their reforms (see Fehr 2009; Lindbeck and Persson 2003 for an overview). The lit-
erature devoted to the topic of retirement age can be broadly divided into two types of
approaches: the concept of an optimal retirement age and a welfare analysis for variety
of the pension system reforms. The former of the strands gives the agents the ability to
select the actual length of labor market activity in addition to the labor supply within
each of the years of the activity, e.g., Cremer and Pestieau (2003) and Fehr et al. (2003).
In some of the models, there are also political economy considerations, with voting over
the socially optimal retirement age (see Fehr et al. 2012; Fenge and Pestieau 2005; Galasso
2008; Heijdra and Romp 2009).
Our paper fits closer to the second strand of the literature. One of the earliest arti-
cles on the topic—by Auerbach et al. (1989)—assumes that the size of the pension system
remains constant, so with delayed retirement, contribution rates are reduced. In this set-
ting, although the reform is, in general, welfare enhancing, the cohorts just prior to the
retirement at themoment of introduction have insufficient room to adjust their labor sup-
ply during the lifetime, whereas the gains from reduced contribution rates are still small
and over a short period of time. Thus, the reform as proposed by Auerbach et al. (1989)
yields welfare loss for these cohorts. The subsequent studies in the field usually followed
a different fiscal adjustment path. Typically, since the increase in the retirement age was
among the considered pension reform scenarios, delaying labor market exit serves the
purpose of reducing the fiscal pressure stemming from the pension system. The fiscal
adjustments stemming from this include reduction in taxes or public debt.
Most of the results are optimistic in a sense that delaying retirement is a viable policy
option for countries with growingly unsustainable pension systems. Fehr (2000) finds that
increasing the retirement age for Germany would yield considerable improvement in fis-
cal stance. Díaz-Giménez and Díaz-Saavedra (2009) demonstrate that a feasible extension
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of the working duration in Spain would be able to put the pension system in balance even
with further longevity (see also Jimeno et al. 2008). However, the welfare of the few ini-
tial cohorts would suffer as a result of the increase. In a comparative study for Germany,
France, and Italy, Boersch-Supan and Ludwig (2010) find positive effects of increased
labor supply and show compelling evidence that increasing the retirement age may be
an effective way to achieve that goal. These papers consistently find welfare improve-
ment with delaying the labor market exits of older cohorts, but sometimes, the gains
are not universal and depend on the type of adjustment in the taxes and pension sys-
tems. Boersch-Supan et al. (2007) provide simulations of old-age labor supply responses
to some policy changes, showing that, for example, actuarially neutral adjustments would
increase the average endogenous exit age in Germany by more than 3 years. However, if
the actuarially neutral system is exposed to other systemic risks, as is often the case with
pre-funded schemes, increase necessitated by risk sharing cannot be offset by the increase
in the retirement age (see Beetsma and Bucciol 2011).
As to the macroeconomic effects, except for improving the fiscal balance, there are
obvious adjustments in the labor supply and capital. The reduction in the K/L ratio
stems from two effects. First, agents expecting lower taxes and/or higher pensions accu-
mulate less wealth to finance old-age consumption (see Futagami and Nakajima 2001).
Second, an increased L mechanically results in a transitory reduction in K/L. In fact,
during the period of the adjustment, economic growth slows down due to slower capital
accumulation. Improved fiscal stance allows for reduction in taxes relative to the baseline
scenario (even if time-wise they need to increase), which gives space to smoothing of the
consumption paths and partly offsets welfare reduction due to less leisure.
The remarkable consistency of these results may stem from a single property: with
increasing longevity, certain increase in the retirement age could be seen as a way to
accommodate for longer expected life duration, thus keeping the relative proportion of
the split between working periods and leisure periods unaffected. With most standard
preferences, this sort of “reform” should have little or no welfare effects if consumption
levels are unaffected and the baseline scenario assumes no change in survival probabili-
ties (see Fenge and Pestieau 2005). This last assumption, however, is not likely to give a
relevant baseline because in most countries increasing longevity is a major feature of the
demographic changes. As argued by Boersch-Supan (2013), under such circumstances,
welfare depends on opportunities related to aging, i.e., the gain in valuable life years. In
fact, early retirement (observed in the data as inconsistent with the observed longevity
increase, but consistent with perverse incentives in themodern pension systems) suggests
that raising the retirement age will be welfare enhancing because it expands the choice set
for the agents. In other words, if the lifetime amount of work is already optimal, extending
the retirement age will incite households to reduce the hours supplied over the necessarily
longer period. Conversely, if it is suboptimal, expanding the choice set can only improve
welfare (see Boersch-Supan et al. 2007; Boersch-Supan and Ludwig 2010).
As to heterogeneity, a number of studies on retirement age—e.g., Boersch-Supan (2013)
and Fehr et al. (2012)—accommodate for ex post heterogeneity, because agents may
experience uninsurable idiosyncratic income shocks. However, none of them explore the
inequalities stemming from both aging and unequal income paths within cohort. This is
in striking discrepancy with the empirical research which shows that income and con-
sumption inequalities increase with age and that a big part of this divergence can be
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explained by the redistributive properties of the pension system (see Castaneda et al.
2003; Storesletten et al. 2004). Furthermore, there is compelling evidence that individu-
als adjust private voluntary savings in response to the expected future pension benefits,
which inevitably translates to changes in the wealth inequality. Domeij and Klein (2002)
show that the generosity of the Swedish pension system actually reduces to zero the pri-
vate savings among a large fraction of the population, making wealth inequalities twice
as high as income inequalities in this country. Indeed, Hairault and Langot (2008) show
that low-productivity individuals have little room to adjust via savings to increases in
tax rates, thus boosting wealth and welfare inequalities in an economy that undertakes
a parametric reform of a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system. A similar effect is confirmed by
Song (2011). Finally, in an empirical study, Sauré and Zoabi (2012) argue that as much as
40% of cross-country variation in the retirement age may be explained by differences in
the occupational composition. Some occupations may make it difficult or impossible to
continue labor market activity beyond a certain age. This finding may also explain why
in many countries workers retire at the eligibility age despite incentives in the pension
system.
Summarizing, the earlier literature suggests that raising the exit age is only welfare
enhancing if the de iure retirement age is too low and the pension system provides dis-
incentives to prolonging labor market activity beyond the official legal limit. If increased
retirement age yields an actuarially neutral adjustment in pension benefits, welfare gains
are more equally spread across cohorts. There is also evidence that increasing the retire-
ment age may be more effective in easing the fiscal tension. Some studies argue that such
policy generates greater welfare gain than reducing the pension benefits or increasing
the contribution rates. These insights, however, mainly concern analyses within one pen-
sion system, most frequently the pay-as-you-go DB systems. Little is known about the
differences in the welfare effects of increasing the retirement age under the DC pension
system, ceteris paribus. There is no explicit analysis comparing the effects of delaying the
retirement with and without a systemic pension system reform.
Our paper contributes to the literature by filling this gap. There are threemain contribu-
tions. First, we tackle directly the issue of “time to adjust,” by comparing three types of the
reform: an immediate and gradual increase in the retirement age, a delayed and gradual
increase, and, finally, a delayed rapid increase. Second, we analyze if these effects depend
on whether or not an economy has already implemented a systemic change from a DB to
a DC system. In order to be able to address these two points, we develop an overlapping
generation model with population longevity. We have two types of economies: one with
a DB system and one in a transition from a DB to a DC system. Third, we analyze these
effects for ex ante heterogeneous agents, i.e., we explicitly ask what is the within-cohort
distribution of the welfare effects. This last contribution seems particularly relevant from
a policy perspective.
3 Model
We develop a general equilibrium overlapping generation model, with exogenous but
time-varying growth as well as longevity.3 Economy is populated by k = 1, 2, . . . ,K classes
of agents with differentiated endowments and preferences (within one family of func-
tions), who live for j = 1, 2 . . . , J periods facing a time- and age-specific mortality rate
πj,t . Agents have no bequest motive, but since survival rates until the age of j at time t –
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i.e., πj,t – are lower than one, in each period t, a certain fraction of subcohort (j, k) leaves
unintentional bequests, which are distributed within their subcohort.
3.1 Production
Individuals supply labor (time) to the firms. The amount of effective labor of age j in
subcohort k used at time t by a production firm is Lt = ∑J¯−1j=1
∑K
k=1Nj,k,tωklj,k,t , where
Nj,k,t is the size of a (j, k) subcohort at time t.
Perfectly competitive producers supply a composite final good with the Cobb-Douglas
production function Yt = Kαt (ztLt)1−α that features a labor-augmenting exogenous
technological progress denoted as γt = zt+1/zt . Standard maximization problem of
the firm yields the return on capital rt = αKα−1t (ztLt)1−α − d and real wage wt =
(1 − α)Kαt z1−αt L−αt , where d denotes the depreciation rate on capital.
3.2 Consumers
Consumers are born at the age of 20, which we denote j = 1, at which time they
are randomly assigned with individual productivity multiplier ωk as well as utility func-
tion parameters. These values do not change until the agent dies and the model is fully
deterministic.4 Thus, a subcohort k of agents within its cohort is described uniquely by
assigned values of φ, ω, and δ (see Section 4).
The year of birth determines fully the survival probabilities at each age j. At all points
in time, consumers who survive until the age of J = 80 die with certitude. The share of
the population surviving until older age is increasing, to reflect changes in longevity. The
data for mortality come from a demographic projection until 2060 and are subsequently
treated as stationary until the final steady state (see Section 4). This modeling choice
is conservative in the sense that DB systems are more fiscally viable if the population
stabilizes.
At each point in time t, an individual of age j and subcohort k born at time t − j + 1
consumes a non-negative quantity of a composite good cj,k,t and allocates lj,k,t time to
work (total time endowment is normalized to one). In each period t, agents at the age of
j = J¯t retire exogenously.5 Consumers can accumulate voluntary savings sj,k,t that earn















where discounting takes into account time preference δk and the probability of survival.








and lj,k,t = 0 for j ≥ J¯t . In this specification, φk determines steady state labor supply. Labor
income tax τ l and social security contributions τ are deducted from gross earned labor
income to yield disposable labor income. Following the Polish legislation, we assume that
the labor income tax τ l is deducted from the gross pension benefit to yield the disposable
pension benefit. Interest earned on savings r are taxed with τk . In addition, there is a
consumption tax τ c as well as a lump-sum taxϒ equal for all subcohorts, which we use to
set the budget deficit in concordance with the data. Received bequests are denoted by beq.
When working, the agents are constrained by earned disposable income, bequests, and
Tyrowicz et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2016) 5:8 Page 7 of 36
savings from previous periods with net interest. When retired, the agents are constrained
by disposable pension benefit, bequests, and savings from the previous period with net
interest. Thus, an agent of type k at age j in period tmaximizes her lifetime utility function
Uj,k,t subject to the following sequence of budget constraints:
(
1 + τ ct
)








sj−1,k,t−1 ← capital income
+
(
1 − τ lt
)
(1 − τ)wtωklj,k,t ← labor income
+
(
1 − τ lt
)
bj,k,t + beqj,k,t . ← pensions and bequests (3)
The full solution to the consumer problem is presented in Appendix 1.
3.3 Pension system
There are two economies, each with a different pension system: an economy with a
defined benefit system and an economy in transition from a defined benefit system to a
defined contribution one. The social security contribution rates are identical in the two
economies, but the tax implicit in the pension system is not due to different algorithms
for computing the pension benefits at retirement. Once the pension benefits are com-
puted for each subcohort, they are indexed with the same rate in both systems and for all
subcohorts. Both our pension systems are of the pay-as-you-go nature, so for the sake of
brevity, we omit this identification when referring to the pension system DB or DC. The
algorithms for computing the pension benefits are described below.
Defined benefit There is an exogenous contribution rate τ and an exogenous replace-
ment rate ρ with bJ¯t ,k,t = ρ · wt−1 · ωk · lJ¯t−1,k,t−1 holding for all j, k. The benefits are











ωkwtNj,k,tlj,k,t + t (4)
where t is a subsidy/transfer from the government to balance the pension system.
Transition to defined contribution The DC pension system collects contributions and
uses them to cover for contemporaneous benefits but pays out pensions computed on the















where rIt is defined by the rate of the payroll growth. Analogously to the PAYG DB case,
the benefits are subsequently indexed annually.
The initial steady state has a DB system. In period one, unexpectedly, an economy shifts
gradually towards a DC system. The gradual transition means that for all cohorts living
already before t = 1, initial capital is computed and implied in the DC system but the
pensions allocated according to the DB rules are honored without any adjustments. Fur-
thermore, agents who were at the age of j = 30 or older at t = 1 also continue to receive
DB pension benefits.7 The obligatory contribution rate τ is kept the same as in the initial
steady state and DB system.
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3.4 The government
The government collects taxes (τ k on capital, τ l on labor, and τ c on consumption, as
well as a lump-sum tax ϒ) and spends a fixed share of GDP on unproductive yet nec-
essary consumption G = g · Y . After calibrating g in the initial steady state, we keep it
stationary throughout the simulations (i.e., constant per effective unit of labor). The gov-
ernment balances the pension system. Given that the government is indebted, it naturally








τ lt ((1 − τ)wtωklj,k,t + bj,k,t) + τ ct cj,k,t + τ kt rtsj−1,k,t−1 + ϒt
]
(6)
Tt + (Dt − Dt−1) = Gt + t + rtDt−1 (7)
We set the initial steady state debt Dt at 45% of GDP, which was the actual value of debt
to GDP ratio in Poland in 1999. We calibrate ϒt in the steady state to match the deficit
and keep it stationary (i.e., constant per effective unit of labor) throughout the rest of the
simulation.
The government debt and consumption tax adjust in response to the changes in fiscal
pressure. First, as deficit in the pension system occurs, the public debt is increased. How-
ever, the public debt cannot be allowed to increase infinitely. Following the Maastricht
Treaty criteria as well as the constitution of Poland, we set the threshold of growth at 60%
of GDP. Once this threshold is hit, consumption tax adjusts. Once all the adjustment in
population and retirement age are fully accommodated by the economy, gradually, over
80 years, the public debt level is reduced back to 45% of GDP, through the consumption
tax. The final and the initial steady states have thus identical levels of public debt share in
the GDP.
3.5 Market clearing





Nj,k,tcj,k,t + Gt + Kt+1 = Yt + (1 − d)Kt .
This equation is equivalent to stating that at each point in time the price for capital
and labor would be set such that the demand for the goods from the consumers, the
government, and the producers would be met. This necessitates clearing in the labor and







and asset market clearing condition is given by






where sj,k,t denotes private savings. We describe the model solving in Appendix 2.
4 Calibration
This section describes the calibration of all structural parameters in the model as well
as the ex ante heterogeneity of preferences and endowments. We first discuss the set
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of exogenous assumptions that underlie the simulations, which in our setting consist of
demographics and technological progress. Then, we move to the macroeconomic struc-
tural parameters, i.e., the calibration of the initial steady state. Given that the model has
the ex ante heterogeneity, we keep this part of the model stylized, along the description in
the previous section, as now themodel is already highly computationally intensive. Finally,
we discuss the calibration of heterogeneous endowments and preferences. The summary
of the calibration is presented in Table 3 in the Appendix 3.
4.1 Exogenous assumptions
The exogenous assumptions are taken from the European Commission Aging Work
Group (AWG) outputs. The path of the technological progress encompasses the condi-
tional convergence of all Member States as of 2030, whereas the demographic projections
are available annually and with reference to each annual age cohort until 2060.
Demographics We keep the size of each new arriving cohort constant, to isolate the
change in the demographic structure solely due to increasing longevity. Thus, ∀t the size
of each cohort at the age of j = 1 is constant. The mortality rate projection for Poland is
then used to compute the size of these cohorts at consecutive ages, thus yielding survival
probabilities πj,t . The projection is available until 2060. We assume both birth rate and
survival rate to be flat after that period, so our population stabilizes after 2140.
Technological progress The model specifies labor augmenting technological progress,
which we calibrate to the path provided by AWG. The overall assumption behind these
forecasts is that countries with lower per capita income will continue to catch up but
around 2030 all countries’ exogenous productivity growth will be converging slowly
towards the steady state value of 1.7% per annum.
4.2 Macroeconomic parameters
Depreciation and investment Depreciation rate d is calibrated to match the investment
rate in the economy given the discount factor δ, i.e., approximately 24%.8
Taxes There are no tax redemptions on capital income tax, so de iure and de facto tax
rates were set equal, which implies τk = 19%. Labor income tax (τl) was set at an effective
11%, which matches the rate of labor income tax revenues in the aggregate employment
fund. Consumption tax τc was set at 11%, which matches the rate of revenues from this
tax in aggregate consumption in 1999. This tax is allowed to increase in the baseline and
reform scenarios if debt hits the threshold of 60% share in GDP.
Pension system The original replacement rate ρ in the DB system was set to match the
share of the pension benefits in GDP in 1999, i.e., 5 %. Subsequently, the social security
contributions were set to reflect the size of deficit in the pension system (denoted in our
model as ), which amounted to 0.8% of GDP in 1999. In the DB system, the ρ param-
eter is held constant throughout the simulation. Also, in all scenarios and all systems,
the contribution rate is held at the same level as the initial steady state. With the chang-
ing population structure and depending on the pension system, the deficit of the pension
system  varies and so does the total sum of benefits to be paid each year.
For cohorts already working under the defined benefit system, there is no data on
accrued savings that could be used to compute pension benefits under defined contribu-
tion. We use the records of the Social Insurance Fund to recover these implied savings,
based on the released sample of 1% of the population. To assure comparability with the
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model, the initial capital is expressed in terms of average wage (w). Hence, we mitigate
any within-cohort heterogeneity there may have been in the data by imposing an equal
starting point to all individuals within a cohort.
4.3 Heterogeneity of endowments and preferences
We have three dimensions of individual within-cohort heterogeneity: impatience and
preference for leisure in the case of preferences and productivity factor in the case of
endowments. Following the previous insights from Hénin and Weitzenblum (2005) and
McGrattan and Prescott (2013) as well as Kindermann and Krueger (2014), we calibrate
them using a micro dataset: the Structure of Earnings Survey.9 In our model, the produc-
tivity endowment is allocated once for the entire lifetime, which is in stark contrast to the
literature with ex post heterogeneity due to income or labor supply shocks during the life-
time. This also implies that the age-productivity profile is flat in our setting. We consider
this to be a conservative assumption, since we want to avoid the confounding between
the changes in the exogenous productivity rate (identical in the reform and baseline sce-
narios) and the change in the structure of the working force (which occurs in the reform
scenario only). Similarly, preference for leisure is set once for the whole lifetime. Thus,
we cannot directly replicate the distribution of the working/non-working population (i.e.,
pick from data a share of individuals who do not currently participate in the labor market
to proxy for a share of individuals who in the model never participate in the labor market).
Productivity endowment (ωk) We estimate a standard Mincerian wage regression with
age (linear and squared), education, occupation, industry, and region controls, as well
as the form of contract (fixed term or indefinite duration) and form of employment
(part-time, full-time, weekends, etc.). We use total hourly wage, including overtime and
bonuses.We use fitted value of log earned hourly wage against the mean of this prediction
for the individuals who were active in the labor market for up to 5 years after graduation.
Thus, we obtain a distribution of productivity multipliers of ω (see Fig. 1a), i.e.,
ωk ∈ {0.6ω, 0.7ω, 0.8ω, 0.9ω, 0.95ω, 1.0ω, 1.05ω, 1.1ω, 1.15ω, 1.2ω}10.
Note that heterogeneity in ω will work as a shift factor in our model, without effect on
the slope. Thus, it is not likely to imply a high variation in terms of welfare.
Preference for leisure (φk) We first calibrate the macroeconomic employment rate, at
55.3% in 1999, to match the data. This is consistent with the average number of hours
Fig. 1 Calibrations based on the Structure of Earnings Survey, 1998. a Calibration of productivity.
b Calibration of preference for leisure
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worked—on average in this period 2050 annual hours according to the Conference Board
Total EconomyDatabase, i.e., 51.5% of the total workable time.We rely on reported hours
actually worked (see Fig. 1b) in the Structure of Earnings Survey which ranges from 31 to
206% of the regular working time to obtain the individual multipliers of the preference
for leisure φ, i.e.,
φk ∈ {0.5φ, 1.0φ, 1.5φ, 2.0φ} .
Discount factors (δk) The aggregate value δ was set to 0.99 to match the interest rate of
6.3%, similar to Nishiyama and Smetters (2007) and consistent with the rate of return on
the asset portfolio of roughly 7%. There are no empirical counterparts for the individual
δk for Poland. We thus chose the following multipliers for δ
δk ∈ 〈0.98δ, 1.0δ, 1.02δ〉,
with the middle value pertinent to 40% of each cohort and the other two values split
equally. While heterogeneous time preference is rather seldom in the literature, it repli-
cates the approach of Hairault and Langot (2008) andMcGrattan and Prescott (2013) who
use heterogeneous morbidity rates. The demographic projection for Poland is only split
by genders, so instead, we rely on δk (see also Doepke et al. 2015).
4.4 The implied within-cohort heterogeneity
The adopted small differences in the parameters of the utility function generate suffi-
cient variation in the life cycle path of labor supply, consumption, and savings. In fact, the
Gini coefficient for consumption in the initial steady state reaches approximately 25.5,
which is a fair approximation of what is observed in the data (see Brzezinski 2011).11
In terms of individual-level differences, they are best observed in life cycle wealth pro-
files. Subcohorts with lower leisure preference (higher values of φ) provide lower labor
supply and have lower lifetime consumption path, ceteris paribus (see Fig. 2a–c). More
patient subcohorts choose a consumption pattern with an inverse U shape and declining
labor supply over lifetime (see Fig. 2d–f). Finally, individual endowments work as shift
parameters rather than slope parameters, i.e. they have little effect on labor supply, but
magnifying productivity implies higher consumption (see Fig. 2g–i). The negligible effect
for the labor supply decision is associated with the fact that productivity endowment has
the same value for the entire lifetime, i.e., has no consequences for the intra-temporal
consumption-labor choice, nor inter-temporal labor choice (income and substitution
effects have similar magnitudes and opposing signs).
4.5 Simulation scenarios
Agents supply no labor when they receive pension benefits, which occurs at the age of J¯ .
They receive these benefits as of this age till death.
Such exogenous retirement age could imply inefficiency, especially in the DC system.
Yet, it is an empirical regularity in most advanced economies that workers claim pen-
sion benefits as early as possible, usually also reducing—often to zero—labor supply
(see Gruber and Wise 2007; Heijdra and Romp 2009). Unlike agents in macroeconomic
models, workers tend to express the sense of being tired or unable to keep up with the
expectations at older ages, even prior to reaching the minimum eligibility retirement age,
as analyzed in the European context by Wahrendorf et al. (2012, 2006) and Van Solinge
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Fig. 2 Life cycle paths of consumption, savings, and labor supply—initial steady state. Note: For any given set
of results, all multipliers but the analyzed one are set to 1. In the simulations, the heterogeneity is allocated
simultaneously along all three dimensions. Thus, subcohorts differ in both level and slope effects, depending
on the combination of values φ, δ, and ω. Varying leisure preference φ: a consumption, b savings, and c labor
supply. Varying impatience δ: d consumption, e savings, and f labor supply. Varying endowment ω:
g consumption, h savings, and i labor supply
and Henkens (2010) with the use of SHARE network data or by Vodopivec (2010) for
Slovenia. In fact, following Siegrist et al. (2007) as well as Schnalzenberger et al. (2014), it
seems that early retirement decisions are motivated by the same set of factors in terms of
accumulated fatigue and perceived health status.
To replicate that feature in a general equilibrium setting with standard preferences, one
could follow two paths. First, impose an exogenous retirement age, as is the case in this
paper. This typically necessitates that such economy will be dynamically inefficient (if
unconstrained, agents would have worked longer and saved less). The alternative solution
is to impose an age-specific productivity pattern, as to reflect gradually decreasing returns
to hours worked. Assuming a flat pattern of endowments, as already argued, we take a
conservative assumption, i.e., changing labor composition due to a longer working period
has no direct effect on the overall output per effective unit of labor. However, empiri-
cal evidence concerning the age-productivity patterns is ambiguous. Despite numerous
studies, the shape of the age-productivity pattern remains a discretionary area, due to the
confounding nature of the age, cohort, and year effects, with an additional bias coming
from selection effects in both the youngest and oldest age groups.12 Most of the stud-
ies assume an inverted U-shaped pattern, but numerous empirical results show that after
isolating the pure age effect on productivity, the profiles prove to be fairly flat and—if
anything—slightly increasing until the age of 65 (see, e.g., Boersch-Supan andWeiss 2011;
Deaton and Paxson 1998; Myck 2010). Assuming a lifetime age-productivity pattern, one
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would also have to consider varying leisure preference over lifetime, opening yet another
channel of discretionary choices.13
In the baseline scenario, the retirement age is kept constant in spite of increasing
longevity. We run the baseline simulation for both types of the pension system, i.e., for
the DB and the transition to a DC system. We propose three reform scenarios:
(i) As of t = 11, we gradually increase the retirement age at the rate of 1 year of
additional work every decade until J¯ = 47—we call this scenario immediate and
gradual increase.
(ii) As of t = 41, we gradually increase the retirement age at the same rate until
J¯ = 47—we call this scenario gradual delayed increase.
(iii) As of t = 41, we immediately set J¯ = 47—we call this scenario delayed immediate.14
All schedules of the retirement age are visible to agents as of t = 1, i.e., these are not
unexpected reforms. Admittedly, the reform introduced as of t = 11 leaves agents less
room to adjust the instantaneous labor supply.
The three types of the reforms permit to address different questions. First, by com-
paring the welfare effects of the immediate and the delayed increase in the retirement
age, we are able to address the question of whether the “time to adjust” is an impor-
tant channel of affecting welfare. Namely, as argued by Boersch-Supan and Ludwig
(2010), some intensive margin adjustment in labor supply is to be expected, when
the reform of the retirement age ushers the extensive margin adjustment. Second,
by increasing the retirement age in an economy with a DB system and an economy
in transition from a DB to a DC system, we can capture the interaction between
systemic and parametric reforms in terms of welfare and fiscal effects. Third, by com-
paring gradual to rapid reforms—both expected by the consumers—we provide insights
on the relative importance of the timing of the reform and its speed. This may be
particularly important for the political economy of such reforms as well as public
support.
In the case of both pension systems, the baseline scenario and the reform scenario
alike are subjected to the longevity and exogenous productivity growth slowdown (see
Section 4). These simulations yield income and consumption distributions across cohorts
and within cohorts (across subcohorts) for each point in time. For each subcohort of type
k, we may observe the change in welfare between the baseline scenario of flat retirement
age and the reform scenario of increasing the retirement age. Since these are computed at
equilibrium, agents fully internalize the changes in prices and pension benefits as well as
fiscal closure (the consumption tax).
5 Aggregate welfare effects
The aggregate welfare effects of the reform are fairly similar for a DB system and for a
transition to a DC system; for all of the analyzed reform scenarios, see Table 1. In addition
to the overall welfare, we report the number of cohorts who observe a welfare loss as well
as the average loss observed by these cohorts. The welfare gain amounts to roughly 3.3–
6.0%. Higher welfare gains under transition to DC than under the DB system suggest a
positive reinforcement between the systemic and retirement age reform. The extent of
the welfare gains is slightly higher than the effects of a systemic reform, as reported for a
similar calibration and economy in Makarski et al. (2016).15
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Table 1 Net consumption equivalent from extending the retirement age
Overall welfare # of losing cohorts Maximum loss
Reform scenario DB (%) Trans. to DC (%) DB Trans. to DC DB (%) Trans. to DC (%)
Gradual and immediate increase 4.60 5.97 30 36 −0.38 −0.52
Gradual delayed increase 3.29 4.60 24 28 −0.03 −0.07
Rapid delayed increase 4.61 5.44 28 22 −0.14 −0.12
Aggregate welfare effect reported and unweighted sum of cohort welfare effects for the cohorts affected by the reform. Average
loss computed only among the losing cohorts
Clearly, the channels through which gains materialize differ between the DB system and
the transition to a DC system (see Fig. 3). Large effects from postponing the retirement
age are especially apparent when comparing the tax rates between the pension schemes.
In fact, the implied tax rate in DB without an increase in retirement age goes up by 60%,
which explains why the welfare gains from delaying retirement are so large. Since the DC
system is inherently balanced, the adjustments here are much lower (up to 20%). Accord-
ingly, in the DC system, the largest part of the welfare gain comes from substantially
increased pension benefits. While they remain essentially unchanged under DB, in the
transition to DC, they increase by as much as 10–12%.
Raising the retirement age is of crucial importance for determining the balance of the
pension system under the DB scheme. A higher contribution base and lower payments
imply lower deficit, which is clearly visible in Fig. 4a, b. In the transition to DC, the effects
of raising the retirement age are of only transitory nature and follow from changes in
the contemporaneous balance between contributions and payments (due to the abrupt
Fig. 3 Fiscal adjustments in response to increasing the retirement age—taxes and pension benefits. Note:
For comparison purposes, we keep the same scales for both pension systems. Pension benefits computed as
an expected stream of retirement income receipts, relative to the average wage in the year a cohort is of age
j = 1. Taxes: a defined benefit and b defined contribution. Pension benefits: c defined benefit and d defined
contribution
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Fig. 4 Fiscal adjustments in response to increasing the retirement age—pension system balance and public
debt. Note: For comparison purposes, we keep the same scales for both pension systems. Subsidy as % of GDP:
a defined benefit and b defined contribution. Debt as % of GDP: c defined benefit and d defined contribution
changes in the contribution base). In general, these systems are individually balanced,
although temporary deficits or surpluses are possible due to swings in the dependency
ratio. The opposite is true for benefits, i.e., DB system should see negligible changes in
the level of pensions from the increase in the retirement age but substantial improve-
ment in the pension system balance. In fact, the increase in the retirement age effectively
balances the pension system in the case of the DB system (see Fig. 4c). There is also an
additional channel of effects on pension benefit receipts, i.e., a shorter retirement period
lowers the total discounted pension payments per retiree. Conversely, in the DC system,
the main effect on incomes and consumption comes from higher per capita pension ben-
efit receipts (see Fig. 3c, d). In fact, in the DC system, raising the retirement age yields
a sort of double gain to the retirees. Namely, a longer contributory period makes the
amount of savings on individual accounts larger, which results in higher discounted pen-
sion payments per retiree. An additional effect comes from a shorter retirement period,
so higher accumulated pension savings are paid over lower number of years. Thus, the
level of pensions raises even more than the discounted pension payments (Fig. 3d).
An interesting effect of longevity surfaces in both pension systems, although relatively
stronger in the transition to DC. Namely, agents become effectively more patient thanks
to longevity, so savings are relatively higher and consumption is relatively lower, thus
reducing the consumption tax base. This diminution in consumption tax revenue is not
compensated by the increase in capital income tax revenue, which triggers a fiscal adjust-
ment in the only free fiscal parameter in our model, i.e., initially the public debt and
subsequently the consumption tax. Consequently, the final steady state has a higher level
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of consumption taxes, while even an economy with a fiscally neutral pension system—
such as DC—experiences an increase in public debt until threshold and subsequent surge
in the consumption tax. A parametric reform of increasing the retirement age mitigates
these effects. There are twomain channels: earned income (longer working period implies
higher lifetime earnings) and labor supply (higher tax base for labor tax revenues). Addi-
tionally, in the case of the DB system, the pension system deficit is substantially lowered
with the increase in the retirement age.
While overall increasing the retirement age seems to be net welfare enhancing, as we
demonstrated in Table 1, the time patterns displayed in Fig. 3 already reveal that the dis-
tribution across cohorts will be diversified. One should expect all the future cohorts to
gain from the analyzed reform, regardless of the pension system, but in the process of
transition, there is a variety of pension benefit and tax adjustments which damage wel-
fare for a number of cohorts. We show the number of the losing cohorts and the average
loss in Table 1, whereas in Fig. 5 we analyze in detail the cohort distribution of welfare
effects. For each of the analyzed scenarios, we present a path of the welfare gains for the
respective cohorts, with the horizontal axis corresponding to the birth date of a cohort.
The nearly universal welfare gain from the increased retirement age differentiates some-
what our results from Auerbach et al. (1989), who find large welfare losses for the initial
cohorts. However, Auerbach et al. (1989) employ reductions in the contribution rate as a
fiscal closure, which yields no gains for the initial retirees and only minor gains for indi-
viduals close to retirement at the moment of the reform.16 In our setting, the lessened
fiscal pressure allows for the consumption tax to be lower than in the baseline scenario,
which redistributes welfare gains across all living cohorts. In fact, the average loss among
the losing cohorts typically falls short of 0.5% of lifetime consumption and is substan-
tially reduced—both in size and in scope—if the increase in the retirement age is delayed.
While it appears that the gain from lower taxes is higher—in terms of welfare—than the
loss due to forced longer labor market activity, we emphasize that the effects are similar
in size and scope for both the DB system and the transition to DC system. The differ-
ences in the welfare effects depending on the type of retirement age reform (immediate
vs. delayed and rapid vs. gradual) are indeed similar.
While the effects are similar, as we discussed above, they aremediated by different chan-
nels. These different channels are likely to have dissimilar effects between agents who
have some room to adjust savings or labor supply and those who do not, as argued earlier
Fig. 5 Welfare effects from extending the retirement age—in % of consumption equivalents. a Defined
benefit. b Defined contribution
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by Hairault and Langot (2008) and Song (2011). We address this point in the next section
where we analyze welfare effects for within-cohort heterogeneity.
6 Within-cohort heterogeneity—welfare analysis
With heterogeneous agents within a cohort, for each cohort, we obtain a distribution
of welfare effects. We present the extreme values of this distribution—minimum and
maximum—as well as the positional measures of the consumption equivalents for the
analyzed reform scenarios in Fig. 6. In all of the figures, the black line corresponds to the
median agent, which should roughly correspond to the results of the representative agent
economy discussed in Section 5. The distribution of the welfare effects is indeed wide,
ranging from virtually 0 welfare gain to as much as 20%. Yet, the sign of the welfare effects
is universally preserved for the future cohorts and is only slightly differentiated. More
importantly, the complementarity of the systemic and parametric reforms holds even
in the setting of within-cohort heterogeneity. Namely, for each of the reform scenario,
Fig. 6 Welfare effects as consumption equivalents—distribution over all subcohorts. Gradual and immediate
increase: a DB and b DC. Gradual delayed increase: c DB and d DC. Rapid delayed increase: e DB and f DC
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when the DB system is compared to the transition to the DC system, similar patterns are
revealed across subcohorts.
While the positionalmeasures of the distribution are interesting, it is not intuitive which
subcohorts underlie the respective percentiles. Thus, we also include a similar analysis for
some selected types of subcohorts17 in Figs. 8 and 9 in Appendix 4. As expected, the vari-
ation in productivity endowment ω does not imply heterogeneity in welfare effects. Yet,
differences in preference parameters drive substantial dispersion in the observed welfare
effects. In fact, the minimumwelfare group from Fig. 6 consists mostly of individuals with
high preference for leisure and high impatience, while the opposite holds for the maxi-
mumwelfare group. Acknowledging these differentiations, twomain conclusions emerge.
First, the sign of the median agent is preserved even for the extreme combinations of the
preference parameters, which implies that the earlier conclusion is not a result of a fairly
ad hoc definition of the instantaneous minimum or maximum but a feature of the reform.
Second, the paths of welfare effects are strikingly similar across the pension systems.
These results show that the welfare effects of increasing the retirement age are indeed
universal, i.e., agents with low patience, high preference for leisure, and low productivity
endowment have the same sign of the welfare effect as the representative agent. However,
as in the case of Fig. 6, this holds for the delayed and gradual reforms.18
An increase in the retirement age postpones the period in which households start to
receive pension benefits, which has two effects. First, additional cohorts stay in the labor
market, which raises labor supply sharply. Second, cohorts having sufficient number of
working periods prior to the retirement age are able to adjust labor supply to optimal lev-
els by changing the hours worked. Agents forced to stay longer in the labor market may
increase the hours of leisure in every period in order to achieve a higher overall utility (see
Boersch-Supan and Ludwig 2010). We decompose the change in labor supply to intensive
and extensive margins. In aggregate terms, the downward adjustment in labor supplied
before the age of 60 is more than compensated by the additional years of working due
to the increased retirement age. In our setting, in the original steady state, labor supply
amounts to 55.3% of their available time. Demographic transition alone increases this
indicator to 61.7–63.2% in the final steady state (depending on the pension system). Over-
all, increasing the retirement age by 7 years implies an increase in workable time by 17.5%
(in the initial steady state, agents work for 40 years). The average increase in the overall
supply of labor falls into the range between 13.7 and 15.4%, depending on the analyzed
scenario. However, these effects are not independent of the preferences.19 The results for
the subcohorts are displayed in Table 2, whereas in Appendix 4: Figs. 10 and 11, we show
the lifetime patters on labor supply under DB and DC, respectively.
Table 2 Labor supply adjustment for heterogeneous agents—final steady state
Pension system Defined benefit Defined contribution
Overall adjustment φ multiplier φ multiplier
in labor supply 0.5 (%) 1 (%) 1.5 (%) 2 (%) 0.5 (%) 1 (%) 1.5 (%) 2 (%)
δ multiplier 0.98 123 119 117 117 119 117 117 117
1 112 113 115 117 109 112 115 117
1.02 100 108 113 117 97 107 113 117
The fully inelastic adjustment, without any behavioral response, implies increase in labor supply by 17.5%. For brevity, we omit ω,
since it had negligible and only level effect on labor supply; detailed results available upon request
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Clearly, even if during the lifetime there is a downward adjustment in the labor sup-
ply, overall, the risks suggested by Boersch-Supan and Ludwig (2010) materialize only to
a small extent in our model—labor supply increases substantially and for nearly all types
of subcohorts (the only exception are agents with high impatience and high preference
for leisure, especially in the DC system). Moreover, the ranking of adjustments in the
labor supply is preserved across the pension systems for the respective subcohorts. The
increases are similar across the pension systems, although DC provides stronger incen-
tives for work. The higher the preference for leisure and impatience, the larger the scope
of labor supply adjustment.
The comparison in Appendix 4: Figs. 10 and 11 reveals, as well, that while our util-
ity function makes labor supply decision fairly resilient to the changes in the incentives,
introducing the heterogeneity in terms of preference parameters allows to explore a wide
variety of lifetime patterns of the labor supply. Given this differentiation, the result of
universal welfare gains should be more convincing.
As a final step, we explore the within-cohort heterogeneity to provide some insights
for the political economy. We also find that the welfare effects are universal across sub-
cohorts, i.e., even the extremes of the welfare distribution preserve the sign from the
representative agent. Yet, during the transition, the pattern of welfare effects depends on
the phasing in of the retirement age reform. Thus, we can obtain the percentage of the
living cohorts that benefit from the parametric reform for both DB and transition to DC
at each point in time. The results are displayed in Fig. 7.
Intuitively, with the time passing by, the support for the reform implemented in t = 1
will gradually increase, since future cohorts benefit from the reform. It is an empirical
matter, however, if there is enough support for such a reform in t = 1, i.e., can it be
politically viable and is political viability different under the DB pension system than that
under the DC pension system. In the case of our model, with heterogeneous agents within
cohorts and 80 overlapping cohorts, the share of agents who experience a welfare gain is
never short of 50%, which would suggest this reform is actually politically viable for ratio-
nal agents. A relatively lower support for delayed reforms stems from the fact that initially
living cohorts observe no welfare effects but the support for this type of reform increases
steeply with the arrival of new cohorts in subsequent years. Clearly, since welfare costs are
concentrated among fewer cohorts in the case of DB than in the case of the DC pension
system, the initial support is larger in the former.
Fig. 7 Percentage of population benefiting from the reform. a Defined benefit. b Defined contribution
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Nowhere in this paper do we demonstrate—nor argue—that either of the two pension
systems themselves are welfare enhancing. It is possible that in the absence of a universal
pension system as well as retirement age, agents would alternatively choose consump-
tion, labor, and savings, working possibly less over possibly a longer share of their lifetime.
In fact, there should be no gains from increasing the retirement age, as there should be
no gains from a pension system at all, as long as agents are unconstrained in consump-
tion/savings choices and can work as long as they like. Thus, rather than actual gains from
retirement age increase, the results demonstrate reduction in welfare distortions intro-
duced in baseline specification. However, such property of the model is only preserved
if there is no age-dependent morbidity20 or if there is no aggregate oversaving in the
economy. These assumptions are violated in our cases—there is age-dependent non-zero
probability of death at any given age j. Moreover, the baseline DC economy oversaves.
In Appendix 5: Fig. 16a–d, we show graphically that in the final steady state the baseline
allocation under the DC system could be improved with labor adjustment at extensive
margin and/or reduced saving.
Summarizing, the welfare effects of increasing the retirement age are similar for an
economy with a DB pension system and for an economy in transition to a DC system.
This result is robust to various rates of phasing in the parametric reform.We also find that
under plausible calibration, welfare effects are generally positive for all cohorts, provided
that agents have sufficient time to adjust labor supply and savings to the changing condi-
tions. Thus, delayed reforms seem to be preferable to immediate ones.Whether or not the
reform is gradual does not affect the overall welfare substantially but may cause the losing
cohorts (and subcohorts) to experience a lower decrease in consumption equivalents.
These conclusions prove to be universal for agents with heterogeneous preferences and
endowments. Introducing heterogeneity allows to elaborate further on the point raised
by Hairault and Langot (2008) that for some types of agents there may be insufficient
room to adjust savings and labor supply, thus leading to welfare deterioration for these
groups of agents via the general equilibrium effects. We show in detail the adjustment in
labor supply, consumption, and savings and find virtually no corner solutions. Of course,
by assuming the Cobb-Douglas shape of the utility function, we constrained the scope
of adjustments in the overall lifetime labor supply. Yet, the instantaneous labor supply in
a lifetime does adjust to the changing incentives. By introducing heterogeneous prefer-
ences, we are able to capture the differentiated adjustments in the labor supply for the
respective combinations of preference for leisure and patience. Indeed, we find that for
some types of agents the change in the age-labor supply pattern is substantial but the
general increase due to the extensive margin trumps any intensive margin adjustment for
nearly all types of preferences.
In general, the earlier literature has found that increasing the retirement age is a rela-
tively “painless” adjustment and yields fiscal relief comparable to other “painful” reforms,
such as reducing the benefits or increasing the contribution rates (e.g., Auerbach et al.
1989; Boersch-Supan and Ludwig 2010; Hviding and Marette 1998). We show, addition-
ally, that welfare effects after implementing the systemic reform from aDB to a DC system
are similar to those under a DB system, although channels of welfare effects differ. Gains
can be universal even if we account for within-cohort heterogeneity. Notwithstanding,
there is a number of caveats for the current study that constitute fruitful avenues for
further research.
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First, it is in the nature of the OLG models that agents are equipped with perfect fore-
sight and thus adjust savings to expected longevity (and—possibly—low pensions). As
our model shows, this channel of adjustment may be quantitatively relevant not only
for the welfare but also for the fiscal effects. Yet, the empirical evidence so far sug-
gests that while in the real world indeed individuals exhibit some response in savings to
changing incentives in the pension systems, the effects are typically small (e.g., Aguila
2011; Feng et al. 2011; Hurd et al. 2012; Lachowska and Myck 2015). This necessitates
modifying the mechanics in the OLG models, but the solutions such as myopia (see
Andersen and Bhattacharya 2011; Cremer and Pestieau 2011; Docquier 2002) or time
inconsistency (see Caliendo 2011; Findley and Caliendo 2012; Imrohoroglu et al. 2003)
have not proven to bring the simulation results substantially closer to the empirical
estimates.
Second, the retirement decision has so far been under-researched in the literature.
Much effort has been put into analyzing the political economy of voting over a de iure
retirement age in the OLG framework. Yet, the labor market exit decision and the eli-
gibility for receiving pension benefits could be considered as two separate dimensions
of agents’ optimization problem (Van Solinge and Henkens 2010). In our models, agents
may decide to reduce the labor supply as early as preferable, but not after the minimum
eligibility retirement age. Given these two main methodological limitations, as common
as they are in the literature, the above results should be taken as an upper bound of the
probable outcomes.
7 Conclusions
It is often argued that if a DB system is replaced with a DC system there is no need to raise
the retirement age. In a sense, introducing a pension scheme which provides incentives to
stay active longer in the labormarket is believed to effectively address the problem of fiscal
pressure due to increasing longevity. Yet, empirical evidence seems to suggest that even
when incentives are aligned, the effective exit age falls short of the minimum eligibility
retirement age (Heijdra and Romp 2009; Sauré and Zoabi 2012; Siegrist et al. 2007). The
literature in the field typically falls into one of the two categories: a theoretical, stylized
framework which answers a conceptual problem or a policy evaluation exercise which
attempts to provide ex ante evaluation of potential reforms to the pension system. Our
paper is closer to the latter strand, but it is distinguished by two contributions. First, we
attempted to provide an intuition on whether the systemic reform is indeed substitutive
to a parametric reform, as often argued in policy debate. Second, we sought to understand
if the potential welfare effects are universal, taking into account differentiation across the
birth cohorts and the within-cohort heterogeneity.
Our overlapping generation framework allows to compare two types of pension sys-
tems: defined contribution and defined benefit. We isolate the effects of longevity
and account for the gradually decreasing rate of the technological progress. We
nest in the model three types of retirement age reform which constitute the con-
sidered policy options: immediate gradual, delayed gradual, and delayed rapid. We
supplement the standard overlapping generation model with a within-cohort hetero-
geneity. While some of the previous studies allowed for differences in endowments,
our setting allows agents to differ in terms of time preference as well as leisure
preference.
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Intuitively, increasing the retirement age may lower the labor supply of households
at the intensive margin, thus reducing or even possibly eliminating the increase at
the extensive margin. This type of adjustment was emphasized by Boersch-Supan and
Ludwig (2010). In addition, Hairault and Langot (2008) argue that welfare effects can
only be positive if agents can adjust both savings and labor supply “enough.” For example,
agents with low endowments and low labor supply (e.g., due to high preference for leisure)
can only adjust at extensive margin, which is likely to substantially reduce their welfare.
In addition to the microeconomic adjustments, there are also macroeconomic conse-
quences of increasing the retirement age. In a DB pension system, later retirement reduces
fiscal imbalances, allowing welfare gains from lower taxes and/or public debt. Under DC
schemes, there are no direct fiscal effects but pension benefits increase substantially. The
objective of this paper was to compare the effects of delaying retirement in a DB pension
system to the same parametric reform implemented in an economy which is already in
transition to a DC pension system. For each of the systems, we simulate the economy with
a status quo of unchanged retirement age and a variety of reform scenarios for increas-
ing the effective retirement age. We compare welfare across cohorts and subcohorts to
analyze the effects of such reforms.
Our study shows that even after a reform to a DC system, increasing the retirement
age has the same welfare effects as under a DB system, although the channels of gen-
erating these welfare effects differ. We find that while differentiated preferences and
endowments indeed imply dispersed welfare effects of the parametric reform, these
results are similar in an economy with a DB system and in an economy in transi-
tion to a DC system. Moreover, if increasing the retirement age is implemented in
a way that allows for smooth internalization of the changed incentives in the inter-
temporal and intra-temporal choices, the welfare gains from the reform are universal.
While heterogeneous agents forced to work for more years adjust the average annual
labor supply downwards, the aggregate labor supply is much higher in the reform
scenario.
Endnotes
1Notwithstanding, the type of pension system may matter for the ability to internalize
the consequences of longevity—the incentives towards early retirement in terms of
pension benefit receipts seem stronger under DB than under DC schemes. Thus,
empirical insights from the past—in general, mostly with DB systems—may be
uninformative if systemic pension reform is in place, because DC improves the link
between contributions (including the number of working years) and benefits. The
majority of the empirical results comes from countries and times when changes in
eligible retirement ages were rare, while the majority of systems had little or virtually no
penalty in terms of future pension benefits and/or taxes for early exits.
2Also, empirical guidance on the actual exit behavior with a DC system and a high de
iure retirement age is scarce.
3We extend a representative agent version of the model (see Goraus et al. 2014).
4See Hénin and Weitzenblum (2005); McGrattan and Prescott (2013) or Kindermann
and Krueger (2014).
5We discuss the assumption of exogenous retirement age in Section 4.5.
6The model is calibrated to the case of Poland. Indexation is stipulated by legislation as
the rate of the payroll growth.
7The details of this reform and modeling of the initial capital are similar to Makarski
et al. (2016).
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8Depending on the period over which the average is taken, it ranges from 23.1% for
2 years before-after span and 24.1% for a 1-year before-after span.
9Unlike McGrattan and Prescott (2013), we rely on individual rather than household
data for three main reasons. First, we cannot obtain reliable indicators of individual
productivity from household budget surveys, whereas family earned income is not
recoverable in the labor force survey for the families where at least one family member
has other-than-wage income. Second, both household budget survey data and the labor
force survey data are self-reported, thus featuring all the well-known problems such as
rounding the reported values of earnings and hours. Third, in the real economy, wage
earners are employed in both the productive sector and the directly unproductive
sector; the latter in our model is in fact expressed in terms of government consumption.
For these three reasons we rely on the Structure of Earnings Survey. It covers the
enterprise sector and comprises a sample approximately 20 times bigger than the LFS or
HBS. The values of hours worked as well as earnings are reported in actual terms by the
employers, which results in a substantially smoother distribution of the two variables.
Finally, this way, we also avoid confusion of wage income and capital income (see
McGrattan and Prescott 2013).
10We ran a similar analysis where median fitted value was to be the metric of
endowments; the distribution is similar. The results are available upon request.
11For the wealth inequality, there is no empirical counterpart for Poland.
12See a special issue of Labor Economics (volume 22, 2013).
13In the alternative specification, we allow for the labor supply to be non-zero for j ≥ J¯t
but reduce age-specific productivity ωj ∀k. We find that even if the productivity drops
abruptly by 80% at j = 41 (corresponding to the age of 60 in the data) the welfare of a
representative agent is increased by the retirement age reform. Detailed calibration and
results available upon request.
14In fact, we increase retirement age by 1 year for every consecutive cohort. If the
increase in the retirement age was introduced at once, for 7 years, no cohort would
retire, creating a substantial surplus in the pension system. Since the pension system
balance affects budgetary balance, that would introduce unnecessary adjustments in the
public debt and tax rates.
15Clearly, this statement does not imply that the gains are additive; the baseline
scenarios differ for Makarski et al. (2016) and this study.
16In Auerbach et al. (1989), contribution rates balance the pension system, which
implies that cohorts just prior to retirement have to work longer and see only a small
gain in lowered τ . Initially, young and future generations benefit from the positive effect
on net wages. Retirees benefit only little from lower contribution rates and face disutility
from reduced leisure, which implies a net negative welfare effect for the older cohorts.
17Full results for the 120 analyzed subcohorts available upon request.
18While the aggregate welfare effect of the representative agent economy ranges
between 3.3 and 6%, the overall welfare effect is stronger in the heterogeneous agents’
economy, ranging between 4.6 and 8%. This amplification is mostly due to the fact that
the strongest losing subcohorts are those that have the lowest lifetime income and, thus,
it is relatively less costly to compensate their losses.
19Admittedly, they are independent of endowments, as illustrated in Fig. 2i.
20In fact, if agents live with certitude until the last year and time preference equals the
interest rate, pension systems are welfare deteriorating (absent liquidity constraints) and
reforms to the retirement age may at best eliminate inefficiency. However, one can show
in a model with liquidity constraints and longevity risk (we need neither in our exercise)
that some pension systems are ex post welfare enhancing, since they provide insurance
against outliving private savings. In the case of uncertain life duration, “non-Ricardian”
effects appear, i.e., it matters for individual welfare in which period an agent receives
income.
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Appendixes
Appendix 1. Consumer problem solution
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The numerators in Eqs. (8) and (9) represent the present discounted value of the
remaining lifetime income.
Appendix 2. Model solving
This section describes the construction of the multi-agent model used to simulate the
scenarios of pension system reform. We present all classes of agents in the system and
the way they interact in the process of simulation. The multi-agent system created to
simulate the effects of pension system reform consists of three different types of agents,
representing various elements of the domain—government agent, private sector agent,
and multiple subcohorts, i.e., heterogeneity within a single cohort.
Subcohorts They represent a part of a cohort that shares the same parametrization,
that is, productivity ω, preference for leisure φ, and time preference δ. In each year
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of the simulation, each subcohort either divides her time between labor and leisure
given Eqs. (1) and (2) and receives salary from the private sector agent (if she is work-
ing) or receives benefits from the government agent (if she is retired), depending on
the age of this cohort, following the budget constraint (3). In both cases, she pays
taxes to the government and spends some of its resources on consumption. Every
subcohort decides about intra-temporal division of time to work and leisure and inter-
temporal division of income into consumption and savings in order to maximize lifetime
utility.
Simulation process The objective is to calculate the effects of different pension systems
on welfare in a society populated by different birth cohorts, where within each cohort
agents have heterogenous preferences and endowments. To achieve this objective, the
system calculates two steady states, representing the initial and final year of the modeled
period, and then computes the transition path between them. Since the general algorithm
for computing both the steady state and transition path is very similar, we describe it just
once, introducing necessary distinctions.
Finding the problem solution is an iterative process using the Gauss-Seidel method.
In each iteration, the choices of agents are updated. The process stops when the dif-
ference between the capital from the new iteration is indiscernible from the previous
iteration, i.e., smaller than a given parameter . On a transition path, the optimization
criterion relies on a sum of  from each period. The parameter  has been set to 10−9
in the steady states (L∞ < 10−9) and a sum over all T set to 10−3 for a transition
path (L1 < 10−3).
Every iteration consists of the same major steps. The government, basing on cap-
ital calculated in the previous iteration (or initial capital in the first iteration) and
parametrization of the model, computes tax rates. Given these rates and the structure
of the pension system, the government also computes pension benefits for the retired
cohorts. Given the amount of capital and labor, firms set interest rates and wages. Given
the tax rates, interest rates, and wages (as well as received bequests), subcohorts choose
labor supplied for each year of their life in the system, as well as consumption and savings.
Given these choices, savings are aggregated to capital, to be compared with the capi-
tal from the previous iteration. If the two values satisfy the norm condition, the process
finishes. Otherwise, a new iteration starts.
Appendix 3. Calibration
Table 3 Calibrated parameters
α Capital share 0.31
τl Labor tax 0.11
φ Preference for leisure 0.5
δ Discounting rate 0.99
d Depreciation rate 0.0515
τ Total soc. security contr. 0.061
ρ Replacement rate 0.18
resulting
Labor force participation 55.3
(dk)/y Investment rate 24.3
r Interest rate 6.3
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Appendix 4. Simulation results
Fig. 8 Welfare effects (consumption equivalents)—subcohorts according to productivity. Note: In all the
displayed simulation results , we keep δ = 1 and φ = 1. Gradual immediate increase: a DB and b DC. Gradual
delayed increase: c DB and d DC. Rapid delayed increase: e DB and f DC
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Fig. 9 Welfare effects (consumption equivalents)—subcohorts according to preferences. Note: In all the
displayed simulation results , we keep ω = 1. Gradual immediate increase: a DB and b DC. Gradual delayed
increase: c DB and d DC. Rapid delayed increase: e DB and f DC
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Fig. 10 Labor supply adjustments for selected subcohorts—DB system. a High patience and low preference
for leisure. b Low patience and low preference for leisure. c High patience and high preference for leisure.
d Low patience and high preference for leisure. eMedian preferences
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Fig. 11 Labor supply adjustments for selected subcohorts—DC system. a High patience and low preference
for leisure. b Low patience and low preference for leisure. c High patience and high preference for leisure.
d Low patience and high preference for leisure. eMedian preferences
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Fig. 12 Consumption adjustments for selected subcohorts—DB system. a High patience and low preference
for leisure. b Low patience and low preference for leisure. c High patience and high preference for leisure.
d Low patience and high preference for leisure. eMedian preferences
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Fig. 13 Consumption adjustments for selected subcohorts—DC system. a High patience and low
preference for leisure. b Low patience and low preference for leisure. c High patience and high preference for
leisure. d Low patience and high preference for leisure. eMedian preferences
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Fig. 14 Savings adjustments for selected subcohorts—DB system. a High patience and low preference for
leisure. b Low patience and low preference for leisure. c High patience and high preference for leisure. d Low
patience and high preference for leisure. eMedian preferences
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Fig. 15 Savings adjustments for selected subcohorts—DC system. a High patience and low preference for
leisure. b Low patience and low preference for leisure. c High patience and high preference for leisure. d Low
patience and high preference for leisure. eMedian preferences
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Appendix 5. Oversaving
Fig. 16 Possible oversaving in the model—“derivative” of utility with respect to capital for the initial and final
steady states, partial equilibrium. Note: The graphs illustrate local changes in the utility of the representative
agent under partial equilibrium. The results at the intersection of the horizontal and vertical lines represent
our general equilibrium result. Subsequently, we locally vary the aggregate capital per effective labor from 99
to 101% of the general equilibrium level and have the agent solve her problem under the resulting prices.
Note that in the case of the DC system with J¯ = 41, utility is locally decreasing with capital, which is a sign of
oversaving on aggregate, as the agent would benefit if the general equilibrium level of capital per effective
labor was lower. a DB system, J¯ = 41. b DB system, J¯ = 47. c DC system, J¯ = 41. d DC system, J¯ = 47
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